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INTRODUCTION
Human cells and tissues are essential in developing and testing new drugs
and vaccines.1 They are also a source of raw material for creating products such as
cell lines and diagnostic tests.2 The most common source of tissues used in
research is from patients undergoing medical treatment.3 Doctors commonly
retain samples of blood, tissue, and cells for research after removing them during
blood tests, biopsies, operations, and other routine procedures.4 After collection,
biobanks and tissue repositories store the samples and distribute them to
government, university, and commercial researchers for a small fee.5
The Research and Development Corporation (RAND Corporation)
estimated that in 1999 there were more than 307 million tissue samples from over
178 million individuals stored in biobanks in the United States and that the
number of samples is increasing by at least 20 million each year.6 Extrapolating
this growth rate, there were approximately 527 million samples in 2010.7 It is
estimated that “most Americans have their tissue on file somewhere.”8
Science and technology are rapidly progressing and the market for cells,
blood, and biopsied tissue is growing along with it.9 These advances in biological
and medical research give rise to new legal and ethical dilemmas concerning the
problem of allocating rights to cells once they are removed from the body.10 In

1. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16, 2006, at 38, 40;
Anthony R. LoBiondo, Note, Patient Autonomy and Biomedical Research: Judicial Compromise in Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 1 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 277, 279 (1991).
2. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori B. Andrews, Introduction: The Body, Economic Power and Social Control,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 (1999); LoBiondo, supra note 1, at 279.
3. See ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES: A
NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES 1 (1999); see also Gail Javitt, Why Not Take All of
Me? Reflections on The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks and the Status of Participants in Research Using
Human Specimens, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 713, 722 n.46 (2010).
4. Skloot, supra note 1, at 40.
5. See ELISA EISEMAN ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES:
“BEST PRACTICES” FOR A BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCE FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC ERA 96,
168 (2003); Javitt, supra note 3, at 721.
6. EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 3, at 137 app. A; see also Skloot, supra note 1, at 40.
7. For reference, in 2010, the U.S. population was 308,745,538. United States Census 2010:
Interactive Population Map, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap (last visited
March 27, 2013).
8. Skloot, supra note 1, at 40.
9. Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317,
359; Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 3, at 1; see also Lisa Milot, What Are We—Laborers,
Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1053, 1088 (2010).
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particular, the collection and use of human tissues for use in research raise
concerns regarding informed consent and compensation.11 Who owns the cells?
Who decides what happens to the cells? Who has rights to the profits derived
from the cells? Two distinct, overarching problems arise: the philosophical
problem of providing meaning and substance to the autonomy and dignity of the
cell donor and the tangible problem of what to do when the research results in a
blockbuster medicine earning substantial profits.12
In answering these questions, courts have not applied any consistent legal
construct, but have haphazardly reached decisions on an ad hoc basis, leading to a
legal landscape that is messy and inconsistent. Because there is no coherent
framework for dealing with allocation of control of human cells and tissues,
different courts have reached different conclusions. This has resulted in various
doctrines that have led to inconsistent and incorrect results. These decisions often
fail to provide meaning and substance to autonomy and neglect to supply an
adequate method of compensation to individual donors. Without a framework
that completely addresses the allocation of control of biomaterials, individual
interests in autonomy and compensation are not adequately protected.
To address these concerns, there needs to be a consistent framework for
dealing with cells once they are removed from the body—one way of analyzing
and allocating control that can be consistently applied to biomaterials used in
research. The contribution of this Note is twofold: first, it provides a taxonomy of
approaches to the problems of ownership and control that arise in allocating rights
to human cells, and second, it presents a framework that provides meaning and
substance to autonomy and leads to a fairer outcome in the case of the
blockbuster drug. This Note has three parts. In Part I, I explain the challenges to
allocating rights to biomaterials and the problems that exist within the current
system because of the unique nature of the cells. In particular, I explore the issues
of consent and compensation that arise in the collection of human cells for
research. First, I discuss the philosophical dilemma of respecting the autonomy
and dignity of the cell donor. Second, I discuss the tangible problem that arises
when research on the cells proves valuable—the blockbuster cases—and
researchers gain significant profits from the cells; under current law, the donor
goes uncompensated. In Part II, I discuss the inconsistent and incorrect
approaches that have evolved in current law as legislatures and courts have
grappled with these issues. In Part III, I offer solutions to the problems of
consent and compensation, providing for a framework that imparts meaning and

11. See EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 3, at xvii, 1.
12. Blockbuster medicine is defined as medicine that generates annual revenues of more than
$1 billion at global levels. Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Preliminary Report 17 (European Comm’n DG
Competition Staff, Working Paper, Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf. However, the issue of compensation is
apparent with any profitable drug, even those below the $1 billion threshold.
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substance to autonomy and grants fairer outcomes in blockbuster cases. Finally, I
conclude with a recommendation of creating a quasi-property right that is tailored
to address these issues.
I. PROBLEM
Because of their relationship to the body, biomaterials are “a unique form of
‘property.’”13 “The legal definition of property most often refers not to a
particular physical object, but rather to the legal bundle of rights recognized in
that object . . . .”14 This bundle of rights generally includes the unrestricted right to
possess, use, exclude, consume, destroy, sell, modify, lease, and give away the
object.15
Because of the unique nature of human cells and tissues, determining rights
to the biomaterials once they have been removed from the body is a challenge.
Allocating rights to cells and tissues involves untangling complex issues of
ownership and control to determine who owns the cells once they are removed.
More specifically, research with biomaterials raises issues of consent and
compensation. Must researchers obtain the donor’s consent to conduct research
on the tissues? Who has rights to the profits derived from the cells? These
questions raise two distinct problems: First, there is the philosophical problem of
providing meaning and substance to the personal autonomy and dignity of the cell
donor. Second, there is the related, tangible problem of allocating compensation
when research on the cells proves valuable, enabling researchers to gain significant
profits from the cells, while the cell donor goes uncompensated.

13. Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht III), 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(depublished) (“[T]he genetic material involved here is a unique form of ‘property.’ It is not subject to
division through an agreement among the decedent’s potential beneficiaries which is inconsistent with
decedent’s manifest intent about its disposition.”). Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht I), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), also refers to sperm as a “unique type of ‘property.’” Note that there
are three Hecht cases: 1) Hecht I, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275; 2) Kane v. Superior Court (Hecht II) , 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); and 3) Hecht III, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222. Pursuant to an order of the
California Supreme Court, Hecht III was ordered not to be officially published. The case cannot be
“cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action” or proceeding (except in limited
circumstances). CAL. R. CT. 8.1115(a). However, “[a] Supreme Court order to depublish is not an
expression of the court’s opinion of the correctness of the result of the decision or of any law stated
in the opinion.” CAL. R. CT. 8.1125(d). See Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, then
Hecht: Isn’t it Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 151, 176–82 (2002) (explaining the three different Hecht cases).
14. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2d ed. 2009) (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (“‘[P]roperty’ . . . denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”) and Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (“[T]his right to exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”)).
15. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 1; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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To illustrate these issues, I will provide an example, using the story of
Henrietta Lacks. Lacks underwent treatment for cervical cancer at Johns Hopkins
Hospital in the 1950s and, unbeknownst to her, launched modern biomedical
research. After biopsying her tumor, Lacks’s doctor collected a small sample of
her cells, which he passed on to a researcher in the hospital. From that sample of
cancer cells, the researcher developed a cell line, “the first immortal human cells: a
continuously dividing line of cells all descended from one original sample, cells
that would constantly replenish themselves and never die.”16 This cell line became
known as “HeLa.”17
HeLa cells have played a major role in understanding and treating diseases
such as cancer, the flu, herpes, leukemia, Parkinson’s disease, and HIV/AIDS.18
They led to the development of the polio vaccine, gave rise to gene mapping and
cloning, and have been used to study the effects of zero gravity, atomic radiation,
and nuclear bombs on the human body.19 Since Lacks’s death, scientists have
cultivated over twenty tons of her cells and obtained nearly 11,000 patents
involving the HeLa line.20 Had Henrietta kept the cells, it is possible that no one
would have benefitted from them—without the HeLa cell line, scientists may not
have achieved some of the greatest accomplishments in biomedical science.
Generally, extracted cells and tissues are little more than medical waste
destined for the hazardous-materials bin. But in some rare instances, the cells, like
those from Henrietta Lacks, have substantial value and lead to development of a
blockbuster drug, vaccination, or test. In these blockbuster cases, the researchers
and pharmaceutical makers stand to earn significant profits, reaping the
commercial rewards from the results of research with human cells. The individuals
who provided the raw materials, on the other hand, go uncompensated for their
contributions and do not benefit economically.21 For individuals like Lacks, whose
tissue proves uniquely useful, this “double standard” is especially exploitative.22
The major medical breakthroughs derived from Lacks’s cells have enabled
researchers and companies selling HeLa cells to earn billions of dollars in profit,

16. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 30 (2010).
17. Javitt, supra note 3, at 717.
18. Dwight Garner, A Woman’s Undying Gift to Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at C1; Ron
Claiborne & Sidney Wright IV, How One Woman’s Cells Changed Medicine, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 31,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/wn/henrietta-lacks-woman-cells-polio-cancer-flu-research-medicine/
story?id=9712579.
19. Garner, supra note 18, at C6.
20. Denise M. Watson, Cancer Cells Killed Henrietta Lacks—Then Made Her Immortal,
PILOTONLINE.COM (May 10, 2010), http://hamptonroads.com/2010/05/cancer-cells-killed-henrietta
-lacks-then-made-her-immortal.
21. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical and Efficient Legal
Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 134 (2009).
22. Id.
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while Lacks’s family had very little money.23 This double standard, which arises in
blockbuster cases, highlights the issue of compensation.
When Lacks went to the doctor fifty years ago, research on human cells was
uncharted territory. Scientists had not yet found a way to keep human cells alive
outside of the body. There was no legal framework in place for the use of human
cells in research because there was no reason to develop one. Doctors did not ask
for informed consent. Today, there is a doctrine in place for informed consent,
but the extent to which it extends to research conducted on cells and tissues once
they have been removed from the body is unclear. The doctrine of informed
consent is generally limited to the provision of medical services. Thus, research
participants often have no cause of action, because the harm they suffer affects
their dignity and autonomy, rather than their medical interests.24 Additionally,
research on excised cells is largely exempt from regulations governing research on
human subjects. Ultimately, informed consent laws do little to protect the
autonomy of cell donors and their right to control the use of their cells.25 These
issues must be resolved to protect the autonomy of donors.26
Although Henrietta Lacks is probably the best-known blockbuster story,
because of the ubiquity of HeLa cells and a best-selling book chronicling her
legacy, this is not an isolated instance.27 Within the last few decades, there have
been lawsuits emerging as donors have begun asserting rights to their excised cells,
tissues, and the information contained in them. Most notably, in California, John
Moore sued his physician, researchers, and the research university after they
obtained a patent on, and received profits from, a cell line derived from his cells.28
In doing so, Moore became the first person to assert a right to his own cells and
the profits arising from them. Research on human cells is becoming even more
prevalent, and profitable, today.
A. Ownership: Who Owns the Cells?
The primary issue that arises in research on human cells is one of ownership:
a determination of who owns the cells once they are removed. Do the cells belong
to the donor whose body produced them? To the doctor who collected samples of
the cells? To the researcher using the samples? To the institution storing the
samples? Depending on the court, the answers to these questions have varied

23. Claiborne & Wright, supra note 18.
24. Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human
Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 307 (2004).
25. Id. at 310.
26. See Erin Colleran, Comment, My Body, His Property?: Prescribing a Framework to Determine
Ownership Interests in Directly Donated Human Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2007).
27. See generally SKLOOT, supra note 16 (explaining that Henrietta Lacks’s story is not an
isolated incident, but an incident that sparked litigation from donors asserting rights to their excised
cells and tissues).
28. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481–82 (Cal. 1990).
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wildly. Some courts have held that researchers own the samples they use,29 others
have held that institutions own the samples they store,30 and in some limited
instances, courts have recognized that individual donors have a limited property
right in the cells removed from their bodies.31
Much of the confusion stems from the fact that extracted human cells are
unique from other forms of property. Excised cells are not clearly property, nor
are they clearly part of the person. Although excised cells are physically separate
from the body, the line is blurred as to whether they are also legally distinct. To
use an example provided by Robin Feldman,
[S]uppose a man severs his finger while sawing wood in his backyard. . . .
[H]e has the right to ask that the finger be reattached, as opposed to any
other potential uses or modes of disposition, including use for
research. . . . The man would claim the finger . . . . because it is his.32
Unlike the severed finger, ownership of excised cells is not so clear-cut.
Courts have been reluctant to grant individuals carte blanche ownership over their
excised cells and tissues.
This confusion is further exacerbated because these extricated parts of our
bodies are not readily susceptible to analogy with anything else.33 Eventually, as
technology expands, judges and lawyers will be analogizing to cells. However,
courts have not yet analyzed whether cells fit into the framework of property law.
Until such analysis is conducted, courts cannot reach the correct result. For now,
researchers, doctors, individuals, and judges are left trying to sort out the issues of
contribution and consent that arise when human tissues are separated from the
body.
B. Consent: Who Decides What Happens to the Cells?
The question of ownership raises further questions regarding consent: a
determination of who has the right to decide what can be done with the cells once
they are removed. Is it up to the researchers to decide what extricated cells may be
used for? Do cell donors need to consent to research on cells removed from their
bodies? Consent entails the power to make decisions about how the cells may be

29. Id. at 488–93 (holding that biomaterials removed from a patient by a physician during the
course of the treatment belonged to the doctor, not the patient).
30. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (finding that
biomaterials that were collected for research purposes were owned by the university where they were
stored rather than by the individuals from whom they were collected or by the doctor who collected
the samples for research).
31. Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht I), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a sperm donor had a testamentary right to leave his sperm in his will).
32. Robin Feldman, Whose Body is it Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects of Property and
Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2011).
33. Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Study in Literature and Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
3, 9–10 (2009).
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used. Generally, property cannot be used without the owner’s consent; thus,
whoever owns the cells has the right to decide what may be done with them. The
issue of consent revolves around philosophical concerns over the personal
autonomy and dignity of the cell donor. Indeed, the main drive behind requiring
consent for medical or research procedures is to ensure “respect for personal
autonomy.”34
A significant number of cell donors are unaware that their samples may be
used for research or commercial activity at the time of removal.35 Henrietta Lacks,
for example, never knew that her cells had become famous or that drug
companies had become wealthy from using her cells; her family did not learn
about the legacy of HeLa until two decades after Lacks’ death.36 Similarly, John
Moore was unaware that researchers were profiting from his cells until several
years after the university had patented his cell line.
The current system where tissue is obtained without donors’ consent “is an
affront to human dignity and autonomy.”37 When an individual like Lacks or
Moore “unknowingly becomes the basis for a commercial product, he may feel
that he has lost some of that self-determination that makes him human.”38 Upon
discovering the patent, Moore “felt that his integrity had been violated, his body
exploited, and his tissue turned into a product.”39 Describing the researchers who
patented his cells without his knowledge, Moore said, “They viewed me as a mine
from which to extract biological material. I was harvested.”40
Personal autonomy and bodily integrity are generally held to be fundamental
to personhood and integral to what it means to be human. Respect for personal
autonomy is a “concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence.”41 It is well
recognized that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.”42 The importance of autonomy

34. Gitter, supra note 24, at 286 (quoting 1 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS —SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987)).
35. See Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating
Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 83 (2002); see also Laura B. Rowe, You Don’t Own
Me: Recommendations to Protect Human Contributors of Biological Material After Washington University
v. Catalona, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 227, 228 (2009).
36. Garner, supra note 18, at C6.
37. Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship Over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 97
(2008).
38. Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient’s Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 179, 190–91 (1988).
39. Andrews, supra note 33, at 5. The Supreme Court held that living organisms may be
patented in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
40. Andrews, supra note 33, at 5.
41. Martin Harvey, Note, Towards a Public Human Tissue Trust, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1171,
1208 (2009) (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
42. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other
grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW
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was recognized and codified by the California State Legislature: “[M]edical
experimentation on human subjects is vital for the benefit of mankind, however
such experimentation shall be undertaken with due respect to the preciousness of
human life and the right of individuals to determine what is done to their own
bodies.”43
To provide meaning and substance to this right, individuals need to be able
to decide what happens to their cells and tissues and how they may be used.
Individuals should maintain the power to control the use of their body parts
because those parts originated in, and once were a part of, their own body.44 Even
after being extracted from the body, “[t]here is something very special about
human organs and tissues. We . . . retain moral interests in them, so that at least
they are not misused or treated in an undignified manner.”45 The principal of
individual autonomy dictates that the individual possess the power to control what
becomes of that tissue.46 As the California Court of Appeal recognized, an
individual “must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her
tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human
privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress.”47 Thus, in developing a
framework, it is imperative to respect the autonomy, dignity, and integrity of the
donor.
C. Compensation: Who Has Rights to the Profits Derived from the Cells?
The question of ownership raises further issues regarding compensation, the
tangible problem of determining who has the rights to the profits, if any, derived
from the cells. Generally, the right to receive income generated by an asset
belongs to the owner. Accordingly, whoever owns the cells has a right to
compensation from profits derived from the cells.
The issue of compensation is most clearly highlighted by blockbuster drugs,
when research on the cells proves fruitful and results in the discovery and
development of a drug yielding substantial profits. It is this subset of cases, where
researchers stand to gain significant profits and donors receive nothing, that most
starkly illustrates the core issue of fairness that motivate a desire to reform. This
inequity is particularly egregious in cases like Lacks’s that result in development of
multimillion dollar drugs and vaccinations. Some state that it is unjust to allow

§ 2805-d (McKinney 2012), as recognized in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992).
43. Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 24171 (2006).
44. Javitt, supra note 3, at 751.
45. Danforth, supra note 38, at 191 (quoting Thomas H. Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the
Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Commercial Purposes, 8 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 3(1986)).
46. Gitter, supra note 24, at 303.
47. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
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researchers and companies to profit from the cells without sharing proceeds with
the donor who provided the raw materials.48 As Lacks’s daughter Deborah put it,
“I always have thought it was strange, if our mother cells done so much for
medicine, how come her family can’t afford to see no doctors? Don’t make no
sense. People got rich off my mother without us even knowin [sic] about them
takin [sic] her cells, now we don’t get a dime.”49
Denying the donor “a fair share of these ample benefits is both unfair and
morally wrong.”50 Intuitively, it makes sense that the individual donor whose cells
are “being commercially exploited, should profit from that exploitation.”51 Thus,
to the extent that financial benefits can be derived from their cellular
contributions, donors should be compensated. Although blockbuster cases are
rare, it is important to have a framework in place for any time money is made
from products derived from human cells.
However, determining the value attributable to the cells is nearly impossible
without removal of the cells from the body and the application of the researchers’
efforts. The biggest issue is how to allocate the value that is inherent to the cells
compared to the value added in the course of research, discovery, and production
of a marketable product. The commercial market in raw human tissue has been
limited for public policy reasons, including concerns about coercion and
exploitation of the poor and the vulnerable, as well as favoring individuals who are
able to pay for organs rather than those who need them most.52 Without a wellfunctioning market, however, there is no way to determine price.
Any value the cells may have is latent and not apparent until after they have
been removed from the body and tested for markers. At the time of removal, the
researcher may have some idea of the potential value, but no way of knowing the
actual value without investing significant time and money.53 When collecting
samples for research, researchers are taking a risk—most of the time the cells have
little scientific value and it is only after considerable time and effort that the value
of the cells becomes apparent.
There is an imbalance of information because researchers have the ability to
evaluate the potential value of cells, whereas donors do not. Only researchers have
the means to test for markers and are able to see the potential value of cells.
Donors are unaware of the value of their cells unless someone informs them of
the value. Because there is an informational asymmetry and no market, the donor

48. See Harrison, supra note 35, at 81.
49. SKLOOT, supra note 16, at 9.
50. Moore, 793 P.2d at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of
Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207,
229 (1986)).
51. Hardiman, supra note 50, at 229.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2006).
53. Javitt, supra note 3, at 749.
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has no way to know the potential value of the cells or what to ask for in exchange
for them. Unlike with an antique clock, where a potential seller can go to another
pawnshop or obtain an independent appraisal of value, a cell donor cannot shop
around for a better price for the cells or obtain a second opinion on their value.
Instead, the donor must rely on the researcher, compromising the donor’s
bargaining power. As a result, the donor may be undercompensated or, as in the
case of Lacks, entirely uncompensated for the value of the cells.
The use of human cells and tissues in biomedical research raises complex
issues of ownership and control and the unique nature of biomaterials gives rise to
challenges in determining rights to consent and compensation.
II. CURRENT LAW
The current law surrounding ownership of biomaterials has developed from
the few cases where donors learned of researchers’ profits and sued to assert their
rights to their cells and the profits derived from them. There is no ex ante
legislative solution governing allocation of rights to biomaterials used in research.
Ultimately, the existing doctrine provides little guidance on allocating control to
biomaterials, and does little to resolve issues of consent and compensation.
In this Part, I discuss the inconsistent and incorrect results that have evolved
in current law as legislatures and courts have grappled with these issues. The
response has been chaotic and disordered, as courts have not applied any
consistent legal construct but instead have haphazardly reached decisions on an ad
hoc basis, resulting in a legal landscape that is messy and unpredictable. Because
there is no coherent framework for dealing with allocation of control of human
cells and tissues, different courts have reached different conclusions. This has
resulted in inconsistent and incorrect results that often fail to provide meaning
and substance to autonomy and neglect to provide for an adequate system of
compensation to individual donors. Without a framework that completely
addresses allocation of control in biomaterials, individual interests in autonomy
and compensation are not adequately protected.
A. Regulatory/Statutory
There is no legislation explicitly regulating research using human cells and
tissues.54 Such research is generally exempt from the statutory and regulatory
schemes governing research on humans and also from those regulating organ
donations. The statutes and regulations that exist are generally inapplicable and
provide little guidance to researchers using human cells.

54.

Id. at 730–31.
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1. The Common Rule
The Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated
regulations, called the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, or the
“Common Rule,” for research on human subjects.55 The Common Rule is the
baseline standard for ethics in government-funded research involving human
subjects in the United States. Penalties for violation of the Common Rule include
withdrawal or restriction of funding or approval, or even suspension or
termination of research.56 Under the Common Rule, a researcher must provide the
research participant with information about the potential risks and benefits of
participating in the research and must obtain informed consent.57 The Common
Rule does not address compensation of research participants.
It is unclear to what extent these regulations apply to excised human cells
and tissues because the Common Rule was developed for “research on living,
breathing humans, not their disembodied tissues.”58 When enacting current
regulations, lawmakers did not imagine the widespread use of tissues in research
that exists today and the regulations have not been updated to address the issues
of control and ownership that arise.59
Most research using excised biomaterials appears to be exempt from the
Common Rule, which only applies to “human subjects.”60 In order for research to
fall within the scope of the Common Rule, a researcher must obtain information
through direct interaction with a living individual or receive private information
that can be directly traced back to the individual.61 Additionally, the Common
Rule only applies to federally conducted, funded, or supported research. The
Common Rule exempts research that involves “the collection or study of existing
data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if the
sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator
in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified . . . .”62 Thus, it does not apply
if the research is not federally funded, if the subject is deceased, or if the samples
are anonymous or publicly available.63
If research on human cells falls within the scope of the Common Rule,
researchers must obtain informed consent. However, there are no clear standards

55. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2012); see also Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
56. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT 684 (1995).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012).
58. Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
59. Javitt, supra note 3, at 730–31 (“[T]he use of tissue in research was not contemplated at
the time current regulations were put in place.”); Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
60. Javitt, supra note 3, at 732–34.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2012); Frequently Asked Questions: Human Subjects Research—Human
Specimens, Cell Lines or Data, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH OFFICIAL EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, http://
grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/hs/faqs_specimens.htm#250 (last updated Feb. 11, 2010).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012).
63. Javitt, supra note 3, at 732–34; see also Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
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as to what constitutes adequate informed consent.64 As the court acknowledged in
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital, “the law regarding a duty for informed
consent for research subjects is unsettled and fact-specific . . . .”65 The method for
obtaining consent varies largely depending on the institution collecting the
samples.66 Most commonly, physicians collect tissue during the provision of
necessary medical treatment, rather than during a research study.67 Doctors
frequently save excised samples to use for research following routine blood tests,
biopsies, surgery, and other medical procedures.68 Typically, consent forms for
medical patients include a clause informing the patient that leftover samples may
be used for research.69 Some doctors ask for permission to keep the tissues, letting
the donors specify what the samples may be used for; others inform the donor
that the institution may use, give away, or sell the sample.70 Some consent forms
are purposely vague about compensation to the donors for their contribution to or
participation in the research.71 Even if the Common Rule does apply to human
tissue research, it provides little protection to individual donors; the regulations do
not create a cause of action for research subjects.72
2. Organ Laws
Laws restricting donation and transplantation of organs similarly fail to
provide guidance in allocating rights to biomaterials in the research context. The
National Organ Transplant Act regulates organ procurement, donation, and
transplantation, and specifically prohibits buying or selling organs for valuable
consideration.73 However, the definition of “organ” does not include blood,
sperm, and ova, which can all be legally sold.74 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) similarly prohibits the purchase or sale of human organs for transplant,
authorizing criminal punishment for violations.75 The UAGA permits organ

64. Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
65. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
66. Skloot, supra note 1, at 45.
67. Id. at 40.
68. Id. at 44.
69. Id. at 45.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1289
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding that there is no private right of action under the Common Rule); Ram,
supra note 21, at 140.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2006); see also id. § 274e(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”).
74. The statute defines the term “human organ” as any “human (including fetal) kidney, liver,
heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other
human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) . . . .” Id.. § 274e(c) (1).
75. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10, 8A U.L.A. 62 (1987) (explaining that selling
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donations for transplant and other purposes, such as research or education, and
specifically allows for directed donations. However, the UAGA is limited to
donations that take effect after the donor’s death.76
B. Common Law
In the absence of legislation or regulation, it has been up to the courts to
determine issues of ownership and control of cells and tissues. “Recent cases
indicate a great disparity in both the methods of analysis and outcomes of
decisions involving property interests in the human body or its parts.”77 The
existing doctrine has developed from the few cases where researchers were able to
earn significant profits from cells and donors subsequently found out and sued to
assert their rights to the profits. Because excised cells do not often prove valuable
and donors rarely find out, the case law regarding allocation of rights to
biomaterials is quite sparse.78
The law that has evolved provides little guidance on allocating control of
biomaterials and does little to resolve issues of consent and compensation.79 The
courts’ response has been chaotic and disordered, resulting in a legal landscape
that is messy and inconsistent.80 In addressing issues of control, courts have taken
varying approaches. Decisions determining property interests in biomaterials have
varied wildly as “different courts have invoked different legal theories to resolve
disputes between researchers, participants, and institutions.”81
Unfortunately, courts have not applied any consistent legal construct but
have instead applied “various legal theories in [pursuit] of what sometimes appear
to be preordained policy goals.”82 Courts have reached decisions on an ad hoc
basis, looking to the relationship of the parties to determine the donor’s rights, if
any, in the cells.83 Courts have alternatively found biomaterials to be property,
quasi property, or sometimes not property at all.84 In analyzing biomaterials,
human organs for transplantation or treatment purposes is a felony punishable by up to $50,000 in
fines or up to five years’ imprisonment or both) (amended 2006). The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
has been adopted in some form by all fifty states. It was adopted in California in CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7150–7151.40 (2007).
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7150.10(a)(3) (2007).
77. Colleran, supra note 26, at 1204.
78. Harvey, supra note 41, at 1172.
79. Harrison, supra note 35, at 83 (“The occasional lawsuit which seeks individual relief is
unlikely to produce a coherent and predictable policy for the variety of circumstances in which
samples are collected, distributed and used in biomedical research and development.”).
80. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 363 (2000) (“The
law of the body is currently in a state of confusion and chaos.”).
81. Javitt, supra note 3, at 731–32.
82. Javitt, supra note 3, at 715; see also Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht III ) , 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222,
227–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (depublished).
83. Rao, supra note 80, at 364 (“[T]he choice of legal category often appears automatic and
reflexive.”).
84. Id. at 363.
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courts have developed little analysis regarding whether biomaterials fit within the
property framework or whether the distinction of classifying biomaterials as
property or nonproperty even matters.85 Rather, “courts have tiptoed around the
issue, leaving an unsettled area of the law.”86
This “piecemeal approach” has resulted in a bizarre “patchwork of doctrinal
rules,” leaving no coherent framework for dealing with the allocation of control in
human cells and tissue.87 Instead, the “status of body parts is shaped by sporadic,
inconsistent judicial analysis, which is woefully unmindful of the rapidly
expanding, unregulated biotechnological terrain.”88 The lack of a coherent
approach has led to inconsistent and incorrect results and disparate treatment of
biomaterials in similar circumstances.89 The makeshift doctrine currently in place
is insufficient to protect the autonomy of cell donors and fails to provide a system
for compensation to donors.90 This section discusses the different ways that
courts have mangled issues of consent and compensation in allocating control of
biomaterials.
1. Doctor-Patient Relationship
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the California Supreme Court
addressed allocation of control in a dispute between a patient and his doctor over
ownership of a cell line derived from the patient’s cells.91 John Moore underwent
treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the University of California, Los Angeles
Medical Center.92 After taking multiple samples of blood and bone marrow from
his patient, Moore’s physician, David Golde, realized that the cells were unique
and potentially profitable.93 He recommended removal of Moore’s spleen and
arranged with a researcher to conduct research on the cells after the surgery.94
Moore consented to the procedure and underwent surgery to have his spleen
removed.95 Neither doctor nor researcher informed Moore of their research plans
or their potential gain, nor did they obtain Moore’s permission to use the cells for
research.96 During the seven years following the surgery, Golde repeatedly asked

85. Id. at 363–64.
86. Gwen Mayes, Buying and Selling Organs for Transplantation in the United States, MEDSCAPE,
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (registration required) (on
file with the UC Irvine Law Review).
87. Feldman, supra note 32, at 1402; Colleran, supra note 26, at 1228.
88. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 387.
89. Rao, supra note 80, at 364; Colleran, supra note 26.
90. Gitter, supra note 24, at 304.
91. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
92. Id. at 481.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Moore to return for follow-up visits, collecting more tissue during each one.97
Golde did not inform Moore that he was taking the samples for his own research
and commercial endeavors, rather than Moore’s medical treatment.98 Using these
samples, the researchers established the “Mo-Cell Line,” which the University of
California Regents subsequently patented.99 The university arranged to share the
profits with the doctor and the researcher.100
It was not until several years had passed and Golde had taken many samples
that Moore found out about the patent. In 1983, Golde gave Moore a consent
form requesting that he voluntarily grant his rights “in any cell line or any other
potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow
obtained from [plaintiff]” to the university.101 Moore signed the form, but “circled
the words ‘do not,’ proceeding a provision relinquishing his ‘rights . . . in any cell
line . . . which might be developed from’” his blood.102 Upon learning of these
events, Moore filed a lawsuit against his physician, the researcher, and the
university regents, alleging conversion and breach of physician’s disclosure
obligations, becoming the first person to assert a legal right to his own tissue and
sue for profits.103 Moore alleged that the tissues, including his spleen, blood, and
the cell line derived from his cells were “his tangible personal property”104 and
that “defendants’ unauthorized use of his cells constitutes a conversion.”105
The Moore decision is noteworthy because it is the first case to address the
allocation of control in research involving human cells. The California Supreme
Court held that Moore did not have a cause of action for conversion.106 The court
explained that Moore did not have ownership of his cells or the right to possess
them at the time of the conversion because he “clearly did not expect to retain
possession of his cells following their removal . . . .”107 Moore did have a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty and failure to obtain informed consent,
however.108 The court held that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for
a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the
patient’s informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s
health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”109

97. Id.
98. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
99. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500; Danforth, supra note 38, at 179–80 n.4.
100. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
101. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 536 n.5 (George, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. SKLOOT, supra note 16, at 203.
104. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
105. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
106. Id. at 497.
107. Id. at 488–89.
108. Id. at 497.
109. Id. at 485.
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Where there is a doctor-patient relationship, the fiduciary duty gives rise to a duty
of informed consent, which mandates disclosure of conflicts of interest, including
economic interests. As for the researcher and the university, the court held that
“none of these defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with Moore or had the
duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to medical procedures.”110
The doctrine announced in Moore only applies if there is a doctor-patient
relationship. It does not apply when the researcher is not a treating physician, or
to research participants generally. The holding is constrained to the injuries that
Moore suffered as a patient, and does not extend to the intangible violation of his
personal autonomy, the “injuries he might have suffered as a source of human
tissue used in scientific research and commercial product development.”111 The
consequences of this narrow holding became apparent in subsequent cases
involving researchers and participants, where there was no doctor-patient
relationship. It does little to protect the interests of tissue donors who are not
patients.112 Moore stands for the idea that once an individual consents to removal
of cells or tissues, that donor no longer has any right to control the use of the
biomaterials.113 The donor has no rights in them.114
Unlike other research participants, patients, like Moore, often need to have
cells removed out of medical necessity. Cells, such as the spleen or appendix, are
often removed because they are no longer useful in the body, or more critically, in
the case of cancer, because they are harmful to the patient. In such situations, the
donor is actually better off without the cells. Because of the medical necessity of
removal in such situations, some courts, like Moore, are hesitant to provide
compensation to the donor for something that would otherwise have been
removed and discarded.
2. Researcher-Participant Relationship
In Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., a U.S. district
court in Florida addressed the allocation of rights to cells in a dispute between a
researcher and cell donors, rather than in a doctor-patient relationship as in
Moore.115 Like the California Supreme Court in Moore, the Florida court in Greenberg
declined to recognize a property interest in biomaterials used in research.116
Daniel Greenberg’s child was afflicted with Canavan disease, a rare genetic
110. Id. at 486.
111. Harrison, supra note 35, at 80.
112. Javitt, supra note 3, at 740.
113. David C. Szostak, Something More to the Story: Moore v. Regents of the University of
California Two Decades Later, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 449 (2010).
114. Id.
115. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070–
71 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
116. Paula C. Evans, Patent Rights in Biological Material: Implications of Principle of Unjust Enrichment
Remain Uncertain, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2006, at 12.
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disorder.117 Greenberg approached Reuben Matalon, a research physician, for help
discovering the gene linked to Canavan disease and developing a test for prenatal
screening to detect the disease.118 Greenberg recruited other families and
nonprofit organizations to provide tissue samples and monetary support for the
research and to set up a national Canavan registry.119 Matalon successfully isolated
the gene and his research institution patented it, providing exclusive access to any
activity related to the gene.120 The families and nonprofits who provided the cells
claimed that they were unaware of Matalon’s intention to patent the gene,
believing that any “testing developed in connection with the research . . . would be
provided on an affordable and accessible basis, and that Matalon’s research would
remain in the public domain . . . .”121 When they found out about the patent, they
sued Matalon and the research institution, asserting lack of informed consent,
breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion.122
Although recognizing that “a duty does attach at some point in the
relationship” and “in certain circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty
of informed consent,” the court declined “to extend the duty of informed consent
to cover a researcher’s economic interests . . . .”123 The court held that a physician
is not required to obtain informed consent from donors of biomaterials. Matalon
did not have a duty of informed consent with respect to the plaintiffs because,
unlike the doctor in Moore, Matalon was not a treating physician and thus did not
owe a fiduciary duty to the research participants.124 The court further held that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim of conversion, because, as in Moore, they did
not retain an ownership interest in the cells after removal.125 The court allowed
the case to proceed on a theory of unjust enrichment and the parties eventually
settled out of court.126
3. Researcher-Institute Relationship
In Washington University v. Catalona, the court examined the relationship
between a researcher and a research institution.127 Unlike the previous cases,
where the dispute involved donors asserting rights to their cells, the dispute in
Catalona was between a researcher and the research institution where the samples
were stored. William Catalona, a research physician, founded a biobank at

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
Id.
Id. at 1067.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1072.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
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Washington University to collect and store biological samples for prostate cancer
research.128 Patients at the university were invited to contribute samples and were
asked to sign informed consent forms, acknowledging that the collection of
samples was for medical research and not for treatment.129 More than 30,000
individuals participated, providing approximately 3500 prostate tissue samples and
100,000 serum samples that were stored in the biobank.130 Eventually, Catalona
left the university and asked the research participants to sign an authorization
form releasing the samples to him. The university sought a declaratory judgment
establishing that it, not Catalona nor the donors, owned the samples stored in the
biobank.131 The court held that the university owned all the tissues in the
repository and that Catalona and the research participants did not have any
ownership interests in the samples.132 Unlike in Moore, the donors here had
expressly consented to the use of their cells in research at the university and had
contractually waived their rights to the cells.
4. Donor-Recipient Relationship
In Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, the Second Circuit addressed
the rights belonging to the intended recipient of an organ donation.133 Unlike the
previous cases, Colavito did not arise in a research context, but from a failed organ
transplant. After Peter Lucia died suddenly, his family donated his kidneys to his
close friend, Robert Colavito, who was suffering from end-stage renal disease.134
The allocation decision was made not by the donor, but by his survivors. The
defendant, New York Organ Donor Network, sent one of Lucia’s kidneys to the
hospital where Colavito was being prepared for surgery.135 Minutes before surgery,
Colavito’s surgeon discovered that the kidney was too damaged to transplant.136
When the surgeons contacted the defendant, they were told that the other kidney
had already been transplanted into another patient and cancelled Colavito’s
surgery.137 Colavito sued the New York Organ Donor Network, alleging
conversion of the organs.138 The parties later discovered that the kidneys could
not have been successfully transplanted into Colavatio, because they were

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 988.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 988–89.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 1002–03.
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 218–19.
Id. at 220.
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incompatible with his immune system.139 Tragically, Colavito died during the
appeal of his case, still waiting for a kidney transplant.140
The court held that Colavito, although a specified donee, did not have a
property interest in the donated organ. Based on the assumption that Lucia’s
kidneys were incompatible with Colavito’s immune system, preventing successful
transplantation to Colavito, the court concluded that Colavito could not have
derived a medical benefit from the organ, and therefore had no cause of action for
conversion.141 However, the court recognized that there could be a situation
where an individual would have an actionable right in the body or organ of a
deceased person, stating that “although the intended recipient of a donated organ
might have a common law right to it under New York law, no such right exists for
the ‘specified donee of an incompatible kidney.’”142
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORKS
The current legal treatment does not address the issues of consent and
compensation that arise in research involving human cells. In this Part, I offer
solutions to these problems in allocating control over biomaterials, providing a
framework that respects the autonomy of the donor and provides for fairer
outcomes in blockbuster cases.
I first analyze two approaches to the problem of ownership of human cells
once they have been removed from the body. One is to create a property right,
giving rise to a cause of action in either conversion or unjust enrichment. The
other is to enhance the framework for informed consent. Both are imperfect
solutions, however, and this Part concludes with an outline of a legal regime that
better protects the rights of donors. In conclusion, I recommend creating a quasiproperty right that is tailored to address the issues of consent and compensation
that arise in allocating control of biomaterials. This framework provides meaning
and substance to autonomy in the collection of human cells for research, creating
a cause of action for when disputes arise, and a remedy for compensation that is
narrowly tailored to blockbuster cases.
A. Property Right
One potential solution is to grant donors an enforceable property interest in
their cells after they are removed. The idea behind this approach is that donors
have made a valuable contribution to the research endeavor and should be
rewarded for that contribution. Donors are “a third party to the biotechnology

139. Id. at 219.
140. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 486 F.3d 78, 79 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007).
141. Id. at 80–81.
142. Id. at 79 (quoting Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 719
(N.Y. 2006)).
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enterprise,” as Justice Mosk wrote in his dissent in Moore, and “[w]hile he may be a
silent partner, his contribution to the venture is absolutely crucial . . . .”143
Granting donors a property right in their cells would promote donor
autonomy, preserving a donor’s ability to decide what is done with his or her
body.144 Donors would be “able to exercise self-ownership in the form of
property rights, with a capacity to exercise rights of inclusion and
exclusion . . . .”145 A property right would also include a right to compensation,
ensuring that donors are entitled to a share of the profits, giving effect to notions
of equity and fairness.146 With a property interest, “a legitimate claim of ownership
can be made, and the ability to redress nonconsensual appropriation is better
established.”147
However, there are several public policy arguments against recognizing a
donor’s property right in biomaterials. Opponents of such a move argue that
extending property rights could “impair scientific advancement”148 and “hamper
vital biomedical progress.”149 Because cells are a fundamental part of biomedical
research, the Moore court declined to grant donors a property right in cells out of
fear that it would “hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw
materials.”150 Opponents also express alarm that a property right would “create
massive liability for scientists, chilling important medical research across the
country.”151
Arguably, cells only have value in the hands of researchers who are able to
coax valuable medications or vaccinations from them. Only researchers, experts in
the field, know how to turn biomaterials into something of value and much of the

143. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 516 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
144. Hardiman, supra note 50, at 235–36; see also Aaron F. Carbone, What Do I Own, if Not
Myself?, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 569, 591 (2008) (concluding that amending New York state law to
give people a property interest in donated tissue expands freedom of contract); Harrison, supra note
35, at 82 (citing injustice between researchers and contributors as a reason for providing a property
right in donated tissue); Rowe, supra note 35, at 256 (arguing that giving donors the right to control
research conducted on their biological material is the most effective means of preventing nonphysical
harm).
145. Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 156
(2008).
146. Hardiman, supra note 50, at 229–30.
147. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 318 (citing Judith D. Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and
Embryos and the Tort of Conversion: A Relational View, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 381, 402–03 (1999)).
148. Hardiman, supra note 50, at 240–41; see also Goodwin, supra note 9, at 362 (discussing the
Moore court’s attempts to balance the rights of individual patients and medical researchers); Szostak,
supra note 113, at 451 (quoting Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“[T]he expansive theory championed by Plaintiffs would
cripple medical research as it would bestow a continuing right for donors to possess the results of any
research conducted by the hospital.”)).
149. LoBiondo, supra note 1, at 305.
150. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990).
151. Szostak, supra note 113, at 453.
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value of blockbuster drugs is the result of efforts of the researchers and drug
companies. Opponents of a property interest argue that researchers and medical
professionals must have control over biomaterials because “people in the scientific
community know how best to use these resources . . . .”152
1. Current Law
Although not widely accepted, property rights in human cells and tissues are
not unprecedented. The California Court of Appeal recognized a property right in
sperm cells in Hecht v. Superior Court.153 Deborah Hecht inherited sperm that her
boyfriend, William Kane, had deposited in a sperm bank before taking his own
life, bequeathing the sperm to her for her use “should she so desire.”154 Kane’s
college-age children contested Hecht’s ownership of the sperm, arguing that it was
part of the estate.155 Focusing on the donor’s intent, the appellate court concluded
that Kane had an ownership interest in the sperm at the time of his death “to the
extent that he had decision making authority as to the use of his sperm for
reproduction.”156 Recognizing “the right of the donor to control the disposition of
his own body,”157 the court held that “[s]uch interest is sufficient to constitute
‘property’ . . . .”158
In a subsequent, unpublished decision, the court recognized that Hecht had
a limited property interest in the sperm, based on the donor’s testamentary
wishes.159 Thus, Hecht had a right to possess and use the sperm as bequeathed to
her in the will, although she “lack[ed] the legal entitlement to give, sell, or
otherwise dispose of [the] sperm.”160 Her interest in the sperm derived exclusively
from the donor’s intent. The court stated,
If we are to honor decedent’s intent as expressed in several written
documents, his sperm can only be used by and thus only has value to one
person, the petitioner in this case. . . .
From decedent’s clear expressions of intent, it is apparent he created
these vials of sperm for one purpose, to produce a child with this
woman.161
The Hecht decision “establishes the principle [that] the intent of the sperm
donor—and no one else’s—controls the disposition and use of the sperm. . . .

152. Id.
153. Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht I), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
154. Id. at 276.
155. Id. at 278–79.
156. Id. at 283.
157. Colleran, supra note 26, at 1227.
158. Hecht I, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
159. Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht III), 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(depublished).
160. Id. at 226.
161. Id.
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‘[T]he fate of the sperm must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn.’”162
Ultimately, “no other person or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference
with [his] decision . . . .”163
In Venner v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals acknowledged that an
individual may have a property right in his body parts. The court noted in dicta
that “[i]t could not be said that a person has no property right in wastes or other
materials which were once a part of or contained within his body, but which
normally are discarded after their separation from the body.”164 Venner involved a
determination of whether police searching for narcotics had illegally seized a
criminal defendant’s feces from a bedpan. Although the court ultimately held that
the defendant had abandoned his excrement for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the court recognized that
[i]t is not unknown for a person to assert a continuing right of
ownership, dominion, or control, for good reason or for no reason, over
such things as excrement, . . . blood, and organs or other parts of the
body, whether their separation from the body is intentional, accidental, or
merely the result of normal body functions.165
2. Causes of Action
A property right would provide for donors in blockbuster cases to receive
compensation, while also respecting the autonomy of donors. Because a property
right would give donors a legally cognizable right in their cells, it would enable
donors to be in a better bargaining position and empower individuals to protect
themselves from affronts to personal dignity as well as unjust enrichment. A
property right would also provide for a substantive cause of action—allowing
donors to sue, alleging conversion or unjust enrichment.
a. Conversion
A donor with a property right can sue for conversion of the cells.
Conversion is a strict-liability tort for wrongful possession or exercise of dominion
of property, depriving the rightful owner of use and possession, without the
owner’s consent.166 To establish conversion, a plaintiff must show that (1) he had
“ownership or right to possession of the property” at the time the defendant took

162. Id. (quoting Hecht I, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (quoting E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene
Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 232
(1983))).
163. Hecht I , 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 602 (Tenn. 1992)).
164. Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
165. Id.
166. De Vries v. Brumback, 349 P.2d 532, 535 (Cal. 1960); Hernandez v. Lopez, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 376, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 533
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (8th ed. 2004).
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possession by a wrongful act and (2) he suffered damages (3) as a result of the
defendant’s wrongful taking.167 The Moore court held that Moore did not have a
cause of action for conversion because he did not have ownership or possession
of the cells at the time of the conversion.168
b. Unjust Enrichment
Alternatively, armed with a property right, donor plaintiffs can seek
restitution for unjust enrichment. Restitution provides plaintiffs an award based
on defendants’ gains rather than plaintiffs’ losses. The theory is that researchers,
by taking cells without providing compensation, have been unjustly enriched. As
the Moore court explained, “Failing to compensate the patient unjustly enriches the
researcher because only the researcher’s contribution is recognized.”169 Under a
theory of unjust enrichment, the donor is entitled to disgorgement of all of the
researcher’s profits that were gained from the researcher’s wrongful use of the
donor’s cells. The Greenberg court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on a cause of
action for unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment is particularly useful in blockbuster cases because it is a
cause of action when the cells are profitable. But if the cells lack scientific value,
there is no case to litigate. Additionally, this avoids the problem of valuation of
cells because donors would be entitled to all of the profits. However, if all of the
profits go to the donor, it would also be unfair because the donor’s contribution
was not the result of personal effort, but rather the result of the individual’s status
as a donor.
3. Conclusion
Creating a property right will not work as a solution. Granting individuals a
property right in their cells is potentially both overinclusive and
overcompensatory, providing too much to donors at the expense of furthering
research. Conversion is a strict-liability tort; it runs the risk of being overinclusive,
because any doctor or researcher involved in research with the cells would
potentially be liable, no matter how minor a role he played. Unjust enrichment, on
the other hand, may be underinclusive because the donor would have to prove
that the researcher’s conduct was wrongful. Unjust enrichment also runs the risk
of overcompensating donors because it disgorges all profits. It does not take into
account value added by the researcher. It “provides an economic windfall to a
patient who, by chance, has rare tissues.”170

167. Hernandez, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381; Baldwin v. Marina City Props., Inc., 145 Cal. Rptr.
406, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
168. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–89 (Cal. 1990).
169. Id. at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
170. LoBiondo, supra note 1, at 304.
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B. Informed Consent
An alternate approach is enhancing the framework for informed consent by
expanding upon the already existing informed consent doctrine or creating an
additional duty of continuing information, requiring researchers to keep donors
informed throughout the research process.
1. “Turbo” Consent
“Turbo” consent calls for expanding upon the already existing informed
consent doctrine to give more content and strength to informed consent and
disclosure requirements and also to clarify to donors whether they are giving up
any rights they may have in their cells.
“It is axiomatic that patients must consent to their own medical treatment.
Here, however, the question is not whether one must consent to undergo certain
treatment, but whether one must consent to the particular use of one’s cells, i.e.,
incorporation of them into a valuable product.”171
The decision to participate in research cannot be truly autonomous unless
the participant is sufficiently informed. Because there is often a great
informational disparity between the researcher and the donor, a duty must be
imposed on the former to obtain the informed consent of the latter.172 “Respect
for these interests requires that would-be contributors be asked if they are willing
to have their tissue used for research, and a meaningful opportunity to decline to
have it used.”173
In a report on Case Studies of Existing Human Tissue Repositories, the RAND
Corporation determined that best practices for research using biomaterials include
obtaining fully informed consent from research participants in a tiered-consent
process.174 Ideally, researchers should obtain two-part consent from
participants.175 First, researchers should obtain consent to the collection of the
biomaterials, allowing the participant to decide the type of biomaterials (e.g.,
tissue, blood, or urine) to be donated.176 Second, researchers should obtain
consent to the use of the biomaterials for research purposes, allowing the
participant to decide the type of research the biomaterials can be used for (e.g., a
specific research project, general research, or genetic research).177
Ownership must be clarified during the informed-consent process to ensure

171. Danforth, supra note 38, at 182 (footnote omitted).
172. Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, 54
UCLA L. REV. 605, 616 (2007).
173. Javitt, supra note 3, at 752.
174. EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 135–37.
175. Id. at 135–36.
176. Id. at 137.
177. Id.; see also Javitt, supra note 3, at 752.
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that donors are clear about the terms of the legal transaction.178 Donors need to
know whether they retain ownership or control over donated tissue. Ideally,
consent to donation should occur separately from consent to the surgical
procedure, or at least in a separate section of the consent form requiring a separate
signature.179
Currently, the Common Rule provides for informed consent, but as
explained in Part II.A.1, above, it is unclear the extent to which the regulations
apply to cells once they are removed from the body. Under the current consent
regime, researchers may fulfill their obligations by presenting donors with a
boilerplate form. Standard consent forms disclose nothing about research on the
biomaterials and give the donors no rights. Generally, so long as the donors give
informed consent to the removal procedure, no further consent is required for
research on excised cells.
One solution is to reform the Common Rule to better protect contributors
by expanding the requirements for informed consent. Proposals for modifying the
doctrine of informed consent include clarifying that the Common Rule applies to
research using human biological material, granting contributors the right to
determine the type of research that is conducted on their biomaterials, requiring
disclosure as part of the informed-consent process, prohibiting blanket consent,
and specifying that researchers may not continue to use a sample if the donor has
objected to its use.180 This solution will permit the collective advancement of
biomedical research, without sacrificing the individual rights and interests of
donors.181 No matter how urgent the need to advance biomedical science, that
urgency cannot surpass the need to respect the dignity of the individual.182 “It is
better for the integrity of the overall scientific research establishment to lose
subjects by providing full information than it is to lose subjects because they lack
trust in that research establishment.”183
However, informed consent alone does not work as a solution because it
does not give donors sufficient control over their cells. It is likely that researchers
would respond to such a duty by adding boilerplate language to consent forms
requiring donors to waive any interests in the cells and rights to future profits.184
The potential for coercion is great, especially if the cells are being removed in a
medical context. As in Moore, the distinction between when cells are removed for
research purposes, as opposed to medical purposes, may be blurred. Patients may
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 143.
Id. at 135–36.
Rowe, supra note 35, at 255–56, 258, 262, 266.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 261 (quoting Sheri Alpert, Privacy and the Analysis of Stored Tissues, in 2 NAT’L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE A-1, A-14 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. Danforth, supra note 38, at 198.
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feel obliged to consent to the use of their cells in research as a condition of
treatment. Doctors could appear to “be linking the provision of treatment to the
patient’s willingness to give up future rights to profits.”185
2. Continuing Information
Currently, few biobanks maintain contact with donors.186 After the initial
contribution, donors have little, if any, interaction with the researchers. However,
as studies with focus groups have shown, donors would like to be kept
informed.187 As one focus-group participant stated, “You have an obligation to tell
these people. They expect something back from you. I’m volunteering some of my
flesh for you to evaluate me. Tell me what’s wrong with it. Not that you could do
something about it necessarily, but at least let me know . . . .”188
One solution to the flaws of the consent regime is to create a duty of
continuing information, requiring researchers to keep donors informed and
apprised of ongoing research throughout the process. It would also encompass a
duty of ongoing advice and consent—at pivotal points in the research, the
participants would have the option to renew consent, withdraw consent, or to
renegotiate. Research has shown that participants would like to “be given choices
at the beginning of the study about what research results they would receive and
the frequency and mode of communication in which they received them.”189 As a
best practice, the RAND Corporation recommends that researchers provide
information about findings from research to donors and physicians via “the
Internet, newsletters, and sessions at scientific meetings, or through other
outreach venues.”190
A duty of continuing information will respect personal autonomy and dignity
of the donor. This solution allows for full disclosure and the free flow of
information to enable people to make fully informed decisions about their bodies
and to be active participants in the research. People are genuinely interested and
want to know what is going on.
Ultimately, a duty of continuing information has the problem of being both
overinclusive and undercompensating. Creating a duty of continuing information
puts an added burden on the researchers because they must take extra steps to
ensure that individual donors are kept in the loop. Even when the samples are
duds, the researchers must still keep track of the participants and keep in touch

185. Id.
186. EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 147.
187. See Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic
Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 41 (2008) (noting that focus group participants demonstrated a
strong desire for access to individual research results).
188. Id. at 40.
189. Javitt, supra note 3, at 728.
190. EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 148.
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with them. Researchers may find that administering such a program takes time and
resources away from conducting research. Furthermore, a duty to provide
continuing information creates no enforceable remedy. As Justice Mosk explained
in his dissent in Moore,
[T]he nondisclosure cause of action (1) is unlikely to be successful in
most cases, (2) fails to protect patients’ rights to share in the proceeds of
the commercial exploitation of their tissue, and (3) may allow the true
exploiters to escape liability. It is thus not an adequate substitute, in my
view, for the conversion cause of action.191
C. Quasi-Property Right
These aforementioned approaches range from imperfect to deeply flawed.
Creating a property right grants too much to the donor, giving rise to
overcompensation and disincentivization of research. On the other hand,
informed consent provides too little, undercompensating the donor and allowing
researchers unfettered access to biomaterials. Conversion is a strict-liability tort
and unjust enrichment allows for disgorgement of all of a defendant’s profits. On
the other hand, informed consent does not provide adequate compensation to
donors in blockbuster cases. Researchers can fulfill their obligations and avoid
potential litigation by adding an extra clause to satisfy the informed-consent
requirement. Ultimately, neither framework provides satisfactory results. The
solution is to find an allocation structure in the middle, respecting autonomy and
integrity and providing adequate compensation to donors in blockbuster cases.
The solution is to create a quasi-property right, which would allow donors to
have a limited interest in their cells after removal. “A quasi-property right is a
limited property right—the owner of the property has some but not all of the
sticks in the bundle of property rights.”192 This limited right would allow donors
to maintain some control over the cells after their removal, recognizing the
donor’s right to consent to research (respecting the donor’s autonomy interest)
and also the donor’s right to receive compensation (respecting the donor’s interest
in sharing in profits received from the cells).
Courts have recognized a quasi-property right in relatives of the deceased,
allowing them a limited property interest in the decedent’s body.193 In this context,

191. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 521 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
192. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies,
69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 n.77 (1990).
193. See Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242 (1872) (holding that
although it is not property, a dead body may be considered quasi-property); 5 B.E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 460 (10th ed. 2005); see also Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,
287 F.3d 786, 793 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899) (“[T]he
next of kin, while not, in the full proprietary sense, ‘owning’ the body of the deceased, have property
rights in the body which will be protected . . . .”)); Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900) (holding

2013]

QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHT IN BIOMATERIALS

795

the quasi-property right provides that the decedent’s next of kin have a limited
right to possess the body, in the absence of testamentary disposition.194 This
includes the right to possess a corpse for purposes of burial and internment, to
prevent its mutilation, and to direct organ donation and research.195 Courts have
recognized that next of kin are entitled to indemnification for violation of this
right, providing a cause of action against individuals who wrongfully interfere with
this right.196
1. Cornea Cases
The most common cases recognizing quasi-property rights of the next of kin
involve due process claims by family members of decedents whose corneas were
removed under presumed consent statutes. In each of the cases, the coroner
removed the corneas of the deceased without giving notice to or obtaining
consent from the decedent’s next of kin. Recognizing a quasi-property right, the
courts in the cornea line of cases held that the next of kin’s quasi-property right
constitutes an adequate property interest entitled to due process protection.
The quasi-property right of the next of kin has been recognized by both the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In Brotherton v. Cleveland, the Sixth Circuit held that
Deborah Brotherton had a quasi-property right in her husband’s body, granting
her the right to possess his body for burial, consent to organ donation, and
control the disposal of his body.197 The court explained that although the
collection of rights regarding dead bodies is limited and is not a full property right,
Brotherton had a sufficient “aggregate of rights” to rise to the level of a
“legitimate claim of entitlement.”198 This quasi-property right provided her the
“right which resides at the very core of a property interest: the right to possess.”199
The State’s interest in promoting organ donation was not sufficient for it to
“consciously disregard those property rights which it has granted” without any
process.200
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the Brotherton decision in Whaley v. County of
Tuscola, holding that “the next of kin [have] a legitimate claim of entitlement and

that next of kin have the right to possession of a body for purposes of burial); Spates v. Dameron
Hosp. Ass’n, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 608–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing the right of next of kin to
bury or preserve a corpse before deciding the issue on other grounds).
194. See Painter v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 91 A. 158, 160 (Md. 1914); 5 B.E. WITKIN,
supra note 193, at 682.
195. See Whaley v. Cnty. of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (6th Cir. 1995); Cohen v.
Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Jordan & Price, supra note
13, at 172.
196. See O’Donnell, 55 P. at 907; 5 B.E. WITKIN, supra note 193, at 682.
197. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480–82 (6th Cir. 1991).
198. Id. at 482.
199. Id. at 481.
200. Id. at 482.
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thus a property interest in a dead relative’s body, including the eyes.”201 The
Whaley court recognized that next of kin have the choice of making a gift of all or
part of the decedent’s body as well as the “right to dispose of the body in limited
circumstances, possess the body for burial, and prevent its mutilation.”202
In Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, the Ninth Circuit followed the Brotherton
court’s reasoning and recognized a quasi-property right belonging to the next of
kin, stating that the “next of kin have the exclusive right to possess the bodies of
their deceased family members . . . .”203 The court emphasized that the quasiproperty right protects “the premium value our society has historically placed on
protecting the dignity of the human body in its final disposition.”204 Although the
next of kin may not have every “twig” in the bundle of property rights, they have
enough “twigs” to maintain a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the decedent’s
body.205
Extending and adapting the quasi-property doctrine to biomaterials would
protect donor autonomy and create a right to compensation in blockbuster cases.
Although this is not (yet) what courts generally are doing—the quasi-property
right in the context of human bodies has been limited to the next of kin context—
the doctrine can easily be extended to biomaterials. If courts are willing to find
that next of kin have a quasi-property right in the body of the deceased, it is not a
stretch to recognize a quasi-property right in a donor’s own body parts while she
is still alive. Courts often recognize quasi-property interests when there is no
existing legal theory to compensate the relatives for the intangible emotional harm
they have suffered.206
2. Application: The Case of Ted Slavin
In this section, I present Ted Slavin as an example to illustrate the
application of the quasi-property right. Ted Slavin had hemophilia and required
multiple blood transfusions as treatment.207 As a result of repeated exposure to
hepatitis B through contaminated blood transfusions, Slavin’s body developed
antibodies to hepatitis B. His doctor realized the value of the antibodies for
scientific research and, unlike doctors in other cases discussed previously,

201. Whaley v. Cnty. of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 1116.
203. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002).
204. Id. at 798.
205. Kathryn E. Peterson, Note, My Father’s Eyes and My Mother’s Heart: The Due Process Rights of
the Next of Kin in Organ Donation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 169, 209 (2005).
206. Id. at 186–87 (citing Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986)); see Colleran, supra note 26, at 1207 (“[The] primary concern in seeking redress for
harm done to dead bodies is not the injury to the body itself but the emotional harm suffered by
surviving family.”).
207. See Baruch S. Blumberg et al., Letter to the Editor, Ted Slavin’s Blood and the Development of
HBV Vaccine, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 189, 189 (1985).
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informed the patient of the potential value of his cells. Slavin was able to control
the use of his cells, becoming “one of the first people in history to decide that
contrary to the way things usually work in science, he would maintain complete
control over any blood and tissues removed from his body.”208 Slavin sold vials of
his blood serum to researchers for as much as ten dollars per milliliter and
provided unlimited free samples to researchers looking for a cure to hepatitis B.209
Using his serum, researchers discovered the link between hepatitis B and liver
cancer and created the first hepatitis B vaccine.210 Because Slavin was able to take
control of his cells from the beginning, he did not need to sue to assert his rights
to them.211
The difference between Ted Slavin and the donors discussed previously—
John Moore, Henrietta Lacks, and the Greenberg family—was information.
Slavin’s doctor informed him that his cells were unique and potentially
scientifically useful.212 As a result, Slavin was able to maintain control over his
tissues on his own terms, deciding who used his cells, how the cells were used, and
who profited from them.213 In this scenario, Slavin had complete control over his
cells. He consented to the removal of the cells from his body and to the research
on the cells. Not only was he aware of the plans to conduct research and the
potential to profit from them, he was actively involved in the process. Each time
his cells were used in research, it was with his consent and he received
compensation (or elected to waive compensation). Ultimately, “the question isn’t
whether people have the ability to control their tissues; it is how much science
should be obligated (ethically and legally) to put them in the position to do so.”214
In an alternate scenario, if the doctor had not informed Slavin that she was
using these samples for research and commercial endeavors, with a quasi-property
right, Slavin would have a cause of action upon discovering that his cells had been
used without his knowledge and consent. Because the cause of action is based on
a quasi-property right, rather than a breach of fiduciary duty, it is not dependent
on the relationship of the parties. The cause of action would extend to cases
where there is no therapeutic relationship, such as Greenberg. And a cause of action
would exist against other defendants, such as researchers who do not stand in a
fiduciary relationship with the donor or have a duty to obtain informed consent to
medical procedures, as well as to institutions and companies that profit from the
cells.
The quasi-property right creates a duty of notice and consent and provides a

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Skloot, supra note 1, at 40.
SKLOOT, supra note 16, at 202.
Id. at 203.
See id. at 202–03.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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cause of action in tort in the event that the duty is breached. With a quasi-property
right, potential tissue donors, like Slavin, would be empowered to decide what
happens to their cells and whether and how they may be used in research, and be
entitled to share in the profits. Although the entire bundle of rights is not fully
recognized, the “quasi-property approach allows an individual to maintain a
limited right to control the disposition” of his cells.215
3. Public-Policy Limitations
Because it is not a full property right, the donor’s quasi-property right would
be subject to limitations in accordance with public-policy concerns. The next of
kin quasi-property right is limited in both time and scope—relatives have a right
to possession for a short amount of time for the limited purpose of disposing of
the body in a dignified manner. The quasi-property right in biomaterials may
similarly be limited in time and in scope to accommodate public-policy
concerns.216 The legislature may define the boundaries of the right, setting limits
on how the tissue may be used and who may financially benefit from its use. In
defining the quasi-property right, courts may also limit the restrictions that donors
may put on the use of their cells. Ultimately, although donors’ rights “may be
subject to important limitations because of public health concerns, the absence of
unlimited or unrestricted dominion and control does not negate the existence of a
property right . . . .”217
CONCLUSION
The collection and use of human tissues for research raise concerns
regarding ownership of the cells once they are removed from the body. There is
no clear framework for determining who owns cells when they are removed from
the body, who decides what happens to the cells once they are removed, or who
has the right to the profits derived from the cells. There is no relevant legislation
regarding ownership of excised cells. The existing doctrine provides little guidance
on allocating control of biomaterials, and does little to resolve issues of consent
and compensation. Courts have haphazardly reached decisions on an ad hoc basis,
leading to a legal landscape that is messy and inconsistent and provides little
guidance for cell donors and researchers. Without a framework that completely
addresses allocation of control of biomaterials, individual interests in autonomy
and compensation are not adequately protected. Therefore, it is necessary to
develop a framework that comprehensively addresses issues of control of and
compensation for human cells once they have been removed.
215. Jordan & Price, supra note 13, at 155 (citing Hecht v. Superior Court (Hecht I), 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
216. Ram, supra note 21, at 169–70.
217. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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One approach to the problem of ownership of human cells is to create a
property right, giving rise to a cause of action in either conversion or unjust
enrichment. Another approach is to enhance the already existing framework for
informed consent. Both are imperfect solutions, however. Creating a property
right in excised cells grants too much control to the donor, potentially impeding
valuable research, while the doctrine of informed consent grants too much control
to the researchers, impinging on donors’ rights of autonomy. Ultimately, neither
framework provides satisfactory results.
In conclusion, I recommend creating a quasi-property right that is tailored to
address the issues of consent and compensation that arise in allocating control of
biomaterials. A quasi-property right would allow a donor to have a limited interest
in her cells after their removal. Extending and adapting the quasi-property
doctrine to biomaterials would protect donor autonomy and create a right to
compensation in blockbuster cases. This framework provides meaning and
substance to autonomy in the collection of human cells for research, creating a
cause of action for when things fall through, and a solution to the compensation
issue that is narrowly tailored to blockbuster cases.

